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Abstract:  We develop a protocol for using a well known lawyer-coded data set on 
Material Adverse Change/Effect clauses in acquisitions agreements to tokenize and 
calibrate a machine learning algorithm of textual analysis.  Our protocol, built on both 
regular expression (RE) and latent semantic analysis (LSA) approaches, is designed to 
replicate, correct, and extend the reach of the hand-coded data.  Our preliminary results 
indicate that both approaches perform well, though a hybridized approach improves 
predictive power even more.  We employ Monte Carlo simulations show that our results 
generally carry over to out-of-sample predictions.  We conclude that similar approaches 
could be used much more broadly in empirical legal scholarship, most specifically in the 
study of transactional documents in business law.  





In recent years, the field of empirical legal studies (ELS) has generated a wealth 
of academic scholarship that is impressive in both its breadth and reach.  Though 
anomalous (at best) within the legal scholarship two decades ago, empirical methods now 
permeate virtually every area of law, including (but not limited to) administrative law, 
constitutional law, corporate / securities law, employment law, civil procedure, and 
jurisprudence.   
To be sure, much of the reason for the recent growth and success of ELS is the 
influx of legally minded scholars with empirically sophisticated methodologies, including 
economists, psychologists, statisticians and sociologists.  But in addition, empirical 
methods have also gained traction because of the expansion of publicly available data.  
As published opinions, regulations, transactional forms and other legal documents have 
become increasingly available in digital form in the mid 1990s, numerous scholars 
interested in the empirical dimensions of law had – for the first time – a significant 
amount of usable raw material to synthesize, interpret, parse, describe, analyze, and test. 
And yet, a significant roadblock continues to hamper the success of empirical 
methods – the fact that empirical legal scholarship tends (by definition) to be “hard,” 
numerical and quantitative, while most original legal sources tend – like the practice of 
law itself – to be nuanced, textual and qualitative.  Consequently, for those interested in 
pursuing empirical questions in law, it is still the norm to rely on human filters as 
transcription vehicles, asking students, researchers, or practicing attorneys to read, 
summarize, classify, and parse quantitative data from their original qualitative texts.  In 
many ways, this human element is unavoidable (and even desirable), since the practice of 
law is in many ways the art of navigating between nuanced forms of expression and hard 
legal outcomes or predictions.  Similarly, the process of hand coding allows those 
inputting data to make nuanced judgments about subtle differences in detail between raw 
data sources (such as transactional documents from different jurisdictions) and how those 
sources are coded into a quantitative dataset (e.g., are the applicable rules immutable in 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1872568
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one jurisdiction and default rules the other?).  In most areas of law practice (and 
particularly technical fields), this appreciation for nuance is invaluable. 
Yet exclusive reliance on human interpretation and hand-coding of legal texts can 
significantly impair one’s ability to marshal the power of textual legal datasets.  Perhaps 
the first of these roadblocks is cost.  Unlike other forms of hand-coding, human coding of 
legal sources generally requires personnel with legal expertise in the practitional / 
jurisdictional area of interest.  Within most developed legal systems, this generally means 
enlisting practicing lawyers or advanced law students to do the work.  But for either 
group, opportunity costs and outside prospects can be significant, driving up the costs of 
collection.  Moreover, such datasets not only entail significant startup expenditures, but 
their marginal maintenance and updating costs remain high as well.  Hand coding raw 
legal/regulatory data is an arduous and painstaking process, often taking weeks or months 
to code a relatively modest set of variables.   
A related roadblock concerns internal reliability and consistency of a hand-coded 
dataset: given the human capital and time requirements of hand-coding, large-scale, 
longitudinal projects, such endeavors often involve a revolving door of personnel.  The 
practice of making judgment calls, relative attention to nuance, and the legal backgrounds 
of contributors vary wildly, both between coders and over time.  It is often difficult if not 
impossible to know the nature / direction of resulting biases, rendering corrective 
measures challenging at best, prohibitive at worst. 
During much of the time in which empirical legal scholarship has been 
developing, computer scientists and natural language theorists have been developing 
tools (largely – though not exclusively – outside of legal applications) for the large-scale 
automated analysis of textual data.  Pioneering developments in these fields, many of 
which have emanated during the last fifteen years, have already come to dominate much 
of computational biology, library sciences, and information technology.  (Indeed, the core 
business of companies like Google has and remains in the management, organization and 
indexing of vast quantities of qualitative data).  Although natural language processing 
approaches are now starting to infiltrate legal practice and scholarship (particularly in the 
areas of e-discovery and analysis of judicial opinions), they have tended to do so in a way 
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that is independent of and parallel to traditional forms of database development within 
legal scholarship.  In most private / transactional law contexts, moreover, these 
approaches are virtually nonexistent. 
In this paper, we propose a quasi-experimental method for using expensive, 
lawyer-coded databases to calibrate (or “tokenize”) a machine learning protocol for 
replicating, correcting, and significantly expanding those databases.  Effectively, our 
approach treats existing hand-coded data as a type of “field experiment,” embodying 
assessments, nuanced judgments and resulting regularities that can inform the basis of a 
set of logical conventions that facilitate automated coding, with potentially greater 
reliability, lower cost, greater scalability, and enhanced speed.  Our specific focus is on 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) agreements executed between 2007 and 2008, and in 
particular the use of (so-called) “Material Adverse Change” or “Material Adverse Event” 
(MAC/MAE) provisions in such agreements.  MAC/MAEs are a central workhorse 
provision for allocating risk and uncertainty that can emerge between the execution of a 
corporate acquisition and its closing – a period that can often take many months (if not 
years).  Such provisions typically condition one party’s (almost always the buyer’s) 
obligation to close the transaction on the absence of any occurrence, condition, change, 
event or effect that materially and adversely affects some enumerated dimension of the 
deal’s value.   When triggered, MAC/MAE provision effectively gives the advantaged 
party the right to “walk away” from a deal (or at least to threaten to do so as a backdrop 
to renegotiation).  Consequently, MAC/MAE provisions tend to be a central focus of 
negotiating parties during an acquisition – they are truly “dickered” as part of the deal. 
(See, e.g., Talley (2009); Gilson & Schwartz (2001); Macias (2009).   
As a tokenizing/experimental dataset, we make use of a well known attorney-
coded database that tracks the presence / absence of twenty different MAC/MAE sub-
provisions in announced agreements executed between 2007 and 2008, and previously 
analyzed in Talley (2009).  Combining this data with the raw text from each deal’s 
MAC/MAE provision, we develop two predictive machine learning protocols – both built 
largely on Python computer code – for diagnosing the presence of each sub-provision.  
The first protocol is based on a “Regular Expression” (RE) algorithm – a Boolean 
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dictionary that summarizes syntactical patterns that are characteristic of each type of 
contractual sub-provision.  The second protocol utilizes “Latent Semantic Analysis” 
(LSA) techniques for analyzing the raw content of each provision by generating a 
frequency table of its terms (a metaphorical “bag of words” inventorying the terms used 
in each MAC/MAE provision).  Each of the RE and LSA approaches is capable of 
generating relatively accurate calibrations that perform reasonably well in replicating the 
hand-coded data (both achieved overall classification accuracies of approximately 80%).  
However, we further demonstrate that when used in combination with one another, RE 
and LSA methodologies perform even better (producing classification accuracies in the 
85% range).  We also employ Monte Carlo methods to simulate the out-of-sample 
predictive power of each methodology (and both in combination), and our results remain 
qualitatively similar (though, not surprisingly, a bit weaker and noisier than in the full-
sample calibration).  Overall, on the basis of this exercise, we conclude that our quasi-
experimental protocol provides a promising approach for replicating, correcting, and 
vastly expanding the depth and breadth of existing hand-coded legal datasets, at a 
significant marginal cost savings. 
Before proceeding, an important caveat deserves explicit attention.  Our enterprise 
in this paper employs a methodology that (we think) is appropriately classified as 
“experimental” in nature; but by our own admission, this is far from a conventional use of 
the term.  We effectively treat an existing hand-coded database as a field experiment, 
which we then utilize to calibrate and tokenize a predictive model, which in turn is 
capable of extending the initial data’s scope and breadth, even beyond their initial 
boundaries.  It is clear that our study design parts company with conventional 
experimental protocols, particularly in relaxing the element of control over the 
experimental setting and manipulations thereof (Camerer & Talley 2008).   
Consequently, our approach cannot make large contributions for questions where 
experimental approaches are thought to be most apt: the task of developing and/or testing 
causal theories of behavior.  On the other hand, our enterprise here is not (or at least is 
not yet) about testing causal theories.  Rather, we endeavor to use quasi-experimental 
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data to calibrate a diagnostic and predictive model of contractual provisions in real world 
contracts.  
Moreover, the general approach championed here can be easily carried over to 
other experimental settings.  Indeed, nothing requires the tokenizing database to be drawn 
from an existing data source – it could also come from more conventional experimental 
manipulations (both in and outside the laboratory).  For example, we are currently 
piloting an extension to this study where subjects in a laboratory are asked to evaluate, 
negotiate, and “price out” a set of specimen MAC/MAE provisions based upon our 
dataset within a hypothetical deal.    This approach – if successful – will allow us not 
only to calibrate a predictive model of the presence / absence of certain canonical 
provisions (as done here), but it will permit us to assemble a cardinal monetary measure 
of the “buyer friendliness” of each provision based on its constituent parts  -- one that can 
possibly also extrapolated outside the experimental sample.  We therefore view the 
current project as a first (but important) step in combining experimental data with 
machine learning approaches for large quantitative text analysis in commercial and 
corporate law. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes MAC/MAE provisions in 
greater detail, and briefly discusses their significance in corporate law and M&A practice.  
Section 3 describes our data and general methodology, including the RE and LSA 
protocols we develop for building our algorithmic models.  Section 4 presents our 
(tentative) results, for both full-sample calibrations and for simulated out-of-sample 
predictions using Monte Carlo methods.  Section 5 discusses our results in greater detail, 
considers a number of extensions to our approach, and concludes.  
 
2. Background: What Is a MAC? 
 
As noted above, our paper focuses on using a pre-existing lawyer-coded database 
of MAC/MAE provisions as a quasi-experimental template for tokenizing natural 
language processing protocols. To better motivate our enterprise, this section spends 
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some time describing what, exactly, these provisions are, what purposes they serve, and 
how they come into existence.   
MAC/MAEs are a species of contractual force majeure (or “act of God”) 
provision that are peculiar to acquisitions and financing transactions.  Put simply, the 
MAC/MAE functions as a type of express condition on one party’s (or sometimes both 
parties’) obligation to complete performance an already-executed contract.   As a matter 
of legal formality, most MAC/MAEs in M&A and financing deals are construed to be 
conditions subsequent: i.e., the occurrence of the enumerated contingency relieves the 
advantaged party of her pre-existing duty to close.  In some situations, however, the 
MAC/MAE can be construed as a condition precedent, whereby the advantaged party has 
no duty to perform unless the enumerated contingency obtains. Although this difference 
may seem to be merely semantic, it has practical implications – for it effectively flips the 
evidentiary burden of demonstrating whether the condition has occurred from the 
advantaged party (in a condition subsequent) to the disadvantaged party (in a condition 
precedent).  
Regardless of how it is construed for evidentiary purposes, the conventional 
architecture of a MAC/MAE provision is perhaps best described as resembling a 
(metaphorical) piece of Swiss cheese.1  One portion of the provision (“affirmative” 
section) usually appears at the beginning of the provision, and constitutes the cheesy bit, 
enumerating often broad categories of contingencies where a material change in 
circumstance relieves the buyer of her obligation to close.  Another portion of the 
MAC/MAE provision (the “exclusion” or “carve-out” section) invariably follows, and 
constitutes the metaphorical holes in the cheese.  The exclusions typically take the form 
of a more lengthy and specific list of enumerated contingencies that do not constitute an 
escape hatch for performance, notwithstanding the broad affirmative provisions. 
The MAC/MAE provision in the 2007 acquisition of the Huntsman Corporation 
(which culminated in the litigated case of Hexion v. Huntsman (2008)) provides an apt 
example of this architecture.  The MAC/MAE from that deal is reproduced in its entirety 
                                                 
1We give due acknowledgment co-author Talley’s 9-year old daughter, Gracie, whose culinary 
obsession with Mac and Swiss cheese provided the initial inspiration for this metaphor. 
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below, with the affirmative portion of the highlighted in blue (dark grey), and the carve-
outs in red (light grey): 
A “Company Material Adverse Effect” means any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect 
that is materially adverse to the financial condition, business, or results of operations of the 
Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole; provided, however, that in no event shall any of 
the following constitute a Company Material Adverse Effect: (A) any occurrence, condition, 
change, event or effect resulting from or relating to changes in general economic or financial 
market conditions, except in the event, and only to the extent, that such occurrence, condition, 
change, event or effect has had a disproportionate effect on the Company and its Subsidiaries, 
taken as a whole, as compared to other Persons engaged in the chemical industry; (B) any 
occurrence, condition, change, event or effect that affects the chemical industry generally 
(including changes in commodity prices, general market prices and regulatory changes affecting 
the chemical industry generally) except in the event, and only to the extent, that such occurrence, 
condition, change, event or effect has had a disproportionate effect on the Company and its 
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, as compared to other Persons engaged in the chemical industry, 
(C) the outbreak or escalation of hostilities involving the United States, the declaration by the 
United States of war or the occurrence of any natural disasters and acts of terrorism, except in 
the event, and only to the extent, of any damage or destruction to or loss of the Company's or its 
Subsidiaries' physical properties; (D) any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect resulting 
from or relating to the announcement or pendency of the Transactions (provided, however, that 
this clause (D) shall not diminish the effect of, and shall be disregarded for purposes of, the 
representations and warranties relating to required consents, approvals, change in control 
provisions or similar rights of acceleration, termination, modification or waiver based upon the 
entering into of this Agreement or consummation of the Merger); (E) any change in GAAP, or in 
the interpretation thereof, as imposed upon the Company, its Subsidiaries or their respective 
businesses or any change in law, or in the interpretation thereof; (F) any occurrence, condition, 
change, event or effect resulting from compliance by the Company and its Subsidiaries with the 
terms of this Agreement and each other agreement to be executed and delivered in connection 
herewith and therewith (collectively, the "Transaction Agreements"), actions permitted by this 
Agreement (or otherwise consented to by Parent) or effectuating the Financing; or (G) any 
occurrence, condition, change, event or effect resulting from or in connection with any 
Divestiture Action…  
 
Even a cursory inspection of this provision yields a few immediate observations.  First, 
while this provision is of roughly average length (clocking in at 422 words), it is far from 
Hemingwayesque, and it contains significant detail.  Second, the affirmative provision is 
brief and drafted in sweeping terms (applying to a shock in circumstances that materially 
affects the seller’s financial condition, business, or results of operations); the carve-outs / 
exceptions, in contrast are spelled out in great, precise, tedious details.  Although this 
MAC/MAE provision was recognized even at the time as having a fairly large number of 
seller friendly carve-outs,2 this general pattern persists across all deals studied here. 
                                                 
2N.Y. Times DealBook, “Huntsman-Hexion: A Deal Agreement to Applaud,” available for 
download at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/11/huntsman-hexion-a-deal-agreement-to-
applaud/ (Jan. 11, 2008, 16:34 EST).  
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Within the larger architecture of a merger agreement, a MAC/MAE might be 
found in one of many different locations.  In some cases it can be found as a stand-alone 
provision, delineated separately from other terms, and specifically granting the favored 
party a contingent right to walk away.  In other deals, the MAC/MAE is incorporated into 
the representations and warranties, explicitly tied to a “bring down” provision that 
effectively scuttles the merger when the MAC/MAE is triggered.  In yet other cases, the 
MAC/MAE appears as an embedded component of the closing conditions to a deal.  In 
yet other deals, the MAC/MAE may be found spread across two or more of these sections 
of an acquisition agreement. 
As the Huntsman excerpt implicitly suggests, negotiating teams often spend a 
significant amount of time dickering the precise terms of MAC/MAE provisions.  The 
provisions have accordingly garnered a great deal of attention from both academics and 
legal professionals.   Theories abound as to what purpose the MAC/MAE plays in an 
acquisitions agreement that is unique from other risk allocation devices (such as 
contingent prices, earn outs, termination fees, indemnities and guarantees, and the like).  
One prominent theory (Gilson & Schwartz 2005) posits that MAC/MAE provisions 
optimally impose risk on the target’s management, which would otherwise have poor 
incentives to maintain firm value in the interim period between execution and closing.  
Others (Talley 2009) have argued that MAC/MAE provisions are uniquely well suited to 
allocate ambiguity about the mutual gains from the deal (as distinct from risk). Still 
others (Choi & Triantis 2009) have argued that MAC/MAE provisions are calibrated to 
facilitate deal restructuring with minimal transaction costs.  It is likely that each of these 
explanations plays a plays role in explaining the purposes behind MAC/MAE provisions.  
For the purposes of this paper, we need not adjudicate among these competing theories.  
We simply note that each of them is, in principle, testable with sufficient empirical data. 





3.  Data and Methodology 
 
The significance that MAC/MAE provisions have for practicing lawyers is 
reflected in the considerable interest within private and academic circles.  Notable among 
these efforts is a longstanding database built by the New York law firm of Nixon 
Peabody LLP, a firm with a substantial mergers and acquisitions practice.  In part as a 
client development service, Nixon Peabody produces an annual survey of MAC 
provisions, publishing summary statistics in an annual publication used widely in the 
industry.3  The firm has been producing its annual survey for over a decade4, and since 
2005 its methodology has become sufficiently consistent to be somewhat usable in time 
series analysis.  We were given access to this database, and sampled 123 acquisitions 
agreements coded in the 2007-08, corresponding with those involving public targets and 
for which we could obtain the full merger agreements from publicly available sources 
(usually the SEC’s Edgar database).   The plurality of the deals (45.5%) involve stock 
mergers, followed by cash mergers (30%) negotiated tender offers (11%), stock 
purchases (9%) and asset sales (4%).  This appears representative of deals occurring 
during the same time span (Talley 2009).  In what follows, we will periodically refer to 
the Nixon-Peabody lawyer coded data set as our “experimental” database. 
All coding for the Nixon Peabody data was done by practicing members of the 
New York bar, usually (but not wholly) comprised of mid-level associates.5 For each 
MAC/MAE in a deal i, the coding attorney was required to identify a vector {yi1, yi2, …, 
yik} of binary “attributes”, effectively indicating the presence / absence of specifically 
enumerated sub-provisions that might be included in the MAC/MAE.  Consistent with 
the architecture described above, attorneys were asked to code both “affirmative” 
MAC/MAE clauses (e.g., terms that deal with the target's financial condition, the seller's 
ability to close the deal, the target company’s prospects, etc.), and exceptions or “carve 
                                                 
3 Nixon-Peabody (2008), 
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/publications_detail3.asp?ID=2488. 
4See id. at 2. 
5Unfortunately, Nixon-Peobody does not keep track of individual coding attorneys, and we are 
therefore unable to control for any coder-specific biases.  That said, we performed numerous hand audits of 
this data in order to ensure its consistency as much as possible (see discussion below). 
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outs” (such as changes to the economy in general, changes to securities markets, interest 
rates, GAAP, etc).  As a general matter, the presence of affirmative MAC/MAEs tends to 
expand the breadth (and the buyer-friendliness) of the provision, while carve outs tend to 
contract that breadth.  For our analysis, we focused on 20 coded provisions, selected 
(largely) at random from the entire set of 44 MAC/MAE provisions coded in the Nixon-
Peabody dataset.  An inventory, brief descriptions and sample frequencies of these 
provisions are contained in Table 1 below. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
As Table 1 illustrates, there are seven affirmative MAC/MAE provisions and 
thirteen carve-outs included in our experimental sample.  They range considerably in 
frequency across deals, from a high of 94.3% (for the affirmative MAC on business, 
operations, and financial condition -- “MBOF”) to less than 3% (for affirmative MACs 
on target losses over a specified threshold – “MExcessLos”, and a MAC on the target’s 
business prospects – “MPrspects”).  Moreover, there appears to be considerable variation 
across categories, as indicated by the correlation matrix across provisions in Table 2, 
below.  Most provisions have weak positive correlation with others, and the mean pair-
wise correlation across terms is approximately 0.25. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
  
Our approach utilizes (and ultimately combines) two distinct methodological 
protocols for classifying textual data:  (1) Regular expressions (RE) or “Boolean” 
protocols; and (2) Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA).  We describe each of them below, ad 
seriatim.  The RE protocol we developed is based upon a hand-built “dictionary” of 
typical/characteristic grammatical patterns that frequently appear across texts, and which 
constitute alternative ways to insert a particular type of provision.  Practically speaking, 
this dictionary very much has the look and feel of a compilation of Lexis / Westlaw 
queries that are applied to the sample MAC/MAE documents for each coded term of 
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interest. For example, in approximately 30% of the experimental data, the MAC/MAE 
contains a carve-out provision for “Acts of God” (see Table 1).  We found we were able 
to identify approximately three-quarters of these instances with a simple search protocol 
that tests for the proximity (e.g., within five words) of the word God and various 
conjugations of the word act.  Other provisions, in contrast, exhibit greater linguistic and 
grammatical heterogeneity, and require more elaborate – and often more numerous– 
conditional search protocols.  Thus, a substantial portion of our Python code consists of 
functions that invoke customized Boolean dictionaries to diagnose the presence or 
absence of each type of lawyer-coded provision in each MAC/MAE. (As one might 
surmise, the process of building these dictionaries proved painstaking, involving nuanced 
reading of example provisions and common sense. We are still working on ways to 
further refine these dictionaries.)  For notational housekeeping, consider provision i in 
our data which with lawyer-coded attributes {yi1, yi2, …, yiK}. Our regular expression 
protocol similarly generates a vector of binary diagnostic predictions about the presence 
of each sub-provisions of the MAC.  We denote these predictions with {ri1, ri2, …, riK}. 
The second protocol was much less structured, and drew on machine learning 
techniques from latent semantic analysis (LSA) literature.  In contrast to RE, the LSA 
approach pays little heed to linguistic architecture of a document (e.g., grammar and 
usage), and concentrates instead on the “raw materials” (e.g., words) that compromise 
that document.  To implement our LSA approach, our Python code extracted, for each 
MAC/MAE provision, a unigram frequency inventory – literally a “bag of words” 
concatenation index, tabulating counts of each unique word across the entire set of deal 
documents.  For the entire dataset, this process resulted in a term frequency matrix 
tracking the raw word counts of approximately 3,000 unique unigrams used across all 
documents.6  Denote this matrix by N, where representative element nij represents the 
number of times term j appears in document i.   
                                                 
6 In an unreported robustness check, we generated (and transformed) raw count not only for single-
term unigrams, but also for bigrams and trigrams of consecutive terms.  This alteration substantially 
increased computing time (generating over 30,000 word frequency variables), while only marginally 
enhancing the predictive power of our model.  We therefore confine our analysis below to the case of single 
term unigram frequencies. 
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Next, and following conventional practice, we transformed the elements of N 
from their raw frequency counts into “term frequency - inverse document frequency” (or 
TF-IDF) measures.  The resulting transformed matrix, T, contains representative element 
tij for document i and term j, defined by 
 
                              
∑
: |
 ,                                         (1) 
 
where m {1,..,M} indexes the universe of documents analyzed.  The purpose and effect of 
this transformation is to accord greater proportional weight to terms that appear with 
large frequency in a particular document and yet are relatively uncommon overall.  The 
first bracketed element of (1) represents the raw count of a given term in document i 
relative to its total across all documents.  The second term consists of the log of the 
inverse frequency with which term j appears (at least once) across the universe (with 
cardinality M) of documents being analyzed.  By “rewarding” the frequent intra-
document use of terms that are rare on the whole, the TFIDF transformation tends to be 
better able to differentiate unique documents (Salton & Buckley 1988).7 
 Because the TF-IDF transformation in (1) has a fixed point at nij=0, the 
transformed matrix T remains both extremely large and extremely sparse.  Following 
conventional approaches in LSA, we therefore proceeded to reduce the dimensionality of 
T through singular value decomposition – a generalized form of principal component 
analysis.  We retained the factors corresponding to the largest six Eigenvalues from the 
decomposition.  Ultimately, for each MAC/MAE provision i, our singular value 
decomposition of T resulted in the generation of factor matrix X with representative row 
xi consisting of the 6-tuple {x1i, x2i, …, x6i}.8   
                                                 
7 We found little difference in results regardless of whether we utilized the matrix of raw unigram 
counts N or the TFIDF transformed matrix T.  Nevertheless, because this transformation is routinely 
applied in the natural language processing literature, we employ it in the analysis that follows. 
8 Note that the factors xi emerging from the singular value decomposition have no natural 
interpretive content, as they are merely algebraic artifacts of the underlying composition of T.  
Accordingly, we will spend no time exploring the intuition behind the estimated coefficients on xi. 
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We are now in a position to use the RE and/or LSA protocols to predict the 
presence of a specific term in the experimental (i.e., lawyer coded) database.  As noted 
above, one interesting advantage of using both protocols is that it becomes possible to 
marshal their combined explanatory power in a hybrid predictive model.  Thus, for each 
MAC/MAE provision k, the baseline empirical specification for all of our predictive 
regressions is one that allows such combination, and is as follows: 
 
                              Pr 1 · ·   ,                                   
(2) 
 
where yik, rik and xi are as described above, and ,  and  are coefficients.  All results 
reported below utilize a logistic maximum likelihood model (though our results appear 
similar under probit and linear probability models as well). 
 
4. Tentative Results 
 
a. Full Sample Calibration 
 
Consider first the estimation of (2) across our entire dataset.  This approach 
generates the most complete calibration measure of our machine learning protocols to the 
experimental data set.  (It does not, however, allow us for test for out-of-sample 
predictions, however – a question we turn to below).  Table 3 reports on the prediction 
characteristics of our logit estimation of equation (2).  The table suppresses the direct 
logit estimation results, as the estimated coefficients are of little interest and most cannot 
be easily interpreted.  Rather, it illustrates predictive performance across all 20 sampled 
MAC/MAE terms, and three different specifications of (2).  (Thus, each row / panel entry 
in Table 3 represents a separate estimation).  In the first panel, we drop all the LSA 
variables, and regress the lawyer-coded attributes solely on our RE predictor.  In the 
second panel, we drop the RE diagnostic and regress solely on the LSA factors.  Finally, 
in the third panel, we include both the RE and the LSA factors in a “hybrid” model. 
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We consider two measures to evaluate predictive performance.  First, we measure 
“correct” categorization rates using an assignment protocol that predicts the presence of a 
term in the experimental data if its predicted probability (at the estimated coefficients) 
exceeds ½.  Second, we compute the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, and 
derive the area under the curve (AUC). (The ROC is a graphical plot of the false positive 
classification rate against the true positive classification rate as one continuously varies 
the critical probability threshold for prediction assignment from 0.0 to 1.0.  A model that 
predicts nearly perfectly will exhibit a highly concave ROC curve, with an area under the 
curve of close to 1.  A model that makes nearly random predictions will exhibit a ROC 
that is approximately linear, with an area under the curve of close to 0.5).9  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Our estimates produce a respectable (though still imperfect) rate of correct 
classification in replicating the Nixon-Peabody data set across the 123 sampled deals.  
Overall, each of the RE and LSA approaches were able to match the sample terms with 
an average 80 percent accuracy rate.  On a term-by-term basis, our mismatch rate range 
between zero and thirty-seven percent.  (Not surprisingly, misclassifications in the RE 
approach are skewed towards false negatives, while they are generally balanced between 
false negatives and false positives in the LSA estimations).  On the whole, the LSA 
estimates tended to yield slightly larger correct classification rates than the RE estimates, 
though in a few situations the LSA predictors preformed much worse.  When the RE and 
LSA approaches were combined, however, classification accuracy generally increased (to 
84%), and in some cases the improvement was dramatic. 
The ROC-AUC measures suggest a similar pattern.  In all our specifications, 
estimated ROC areas indicated that each of our approaches is diagnostically probative.  
Moreover, the combination of RE and LSA approaches delivers a discernible increase in 
predictive performance across nearly all coded terms.  We view these base results as a 
                                                 
9 As Hanczar et al (2010) recently demonstrated, the ROC-AUC metric can suffer from being 
relatively noisy in smaller data sets.  We nevertheless use it here as a general guidepost, especially in light 
of the absence of alternative good measures of predictive probity.  
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promising start, but one that can be significantly improved upon with more consultative 
and programming attention.  In fact, there may be a sense in which these figures 
understate the accuracy of our approach, since the Nixon-Peabody data invariably will 
contain undetected coding errors.  Auditing some of the evident mismatches, we 
discovered that Nixon-Peabody attorneys appear to have had a mis-coding rate in excess 
of 3%.  Consequently, it is plausible that Table 3 understates the correct categorization 
rate relative to the “true” underlying contractual terms.10   
 
b. Out of Sample Monte Carlo Prediction 
 
Although Table 3 illustrates the explanatory power gained by marshaling both 
regular expression and latent semantic techniques for predicting the presence / absence of 
particular terms, its results are distinctly within sample. They need not (and likely do not) 
remain as strong when the predictive model is taken outside of the sample constellation 
of deals.  Yet it is predominantly in out-of-sample prediction where our approach can be 
useful in economizing the time and energy consumed by hand coding.  The discussion 
below, therefore, considers out-of-sample prediction issues more squarely. 
In order to simulate out of sample prediction, we employed a Monte Carlo 
bootstrap aggregation (“bagging”) approach proposed originally by Brieman (1996).   We 
devised an identical bagging protocol for each contractual provision studied (i.e., each of 
the 20 affirmative MACs/MAEs and exceptions).  Within each Monte Carlo iteration, the 
data were randomly segregated into two groups: A “training” dataset, consisting of 
roughly 75 percent of our observations, and a “testing” dataset, consisting of the 
remaining 25 percent of the data.  We then fit equation (2) to the “training” data using 
(successively) LSA and hybrid approaches.  And as before, we used the coefficient 
estimates to make probabilistic predictions of the presence/absence of the contractual 
term at issue in the remaining testing data, generating estimates of both correct 
classification rates, and of ROC-AUCs.  For each of the 20 terms studied, we repeated the 
                                                 
10 This assertion, of course, requires significantly more investigation. For example, we have not yet 
audited any of the evidently correctly matched terms to determine whether both the Nixon-Peabody data as 
well as our own protocol are mis-coding some deals. 
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Monte Carlo simulation 1,000 times. 11  (Each succeeding iteration re-sampled our 
training/testing data with replacement.)  Table 4, therefore, reports on the resulting 
empirical distributions of both classification rates and ROC-AUCs.  (Note that the table 
reports only on the “pure” LSA and the hybrid model, excluding the pure RE model – 
given the way that the RE dictionary was assembled, Monte Carlo methods were not 
informative  for the pure RE model). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
As expected, the out of sample predictions in Table 4 are weaker and noisier than 
the full-sample calibrations of Table 4.  Moreover, for two provisions (MExcessLoss and 
MProspects), there was simply not enough data variability within the sample to execute 
the bagging protocol with a training dataset with any consistency.  Nevertheless, for the 
remaining terms, our simulated out of sample predictions appear to remain relatively 
strong.  Average correct classification rates across all terms are approximately 73.5% for 
the LSA specification and 78% for the hybrid specification.  The ROC-AUC measures 
also appear relatively good – only slightly smaller numerically than those in Table 3, but 
subject to considerably more noise.   
In unreported robustness checks, we reran the bagging protocol with varying 
proportions of training / testing data.  The results were largely consistent – though they 
tended to weaken as our training database shrank below 50% of the entire sample.  We 
conjecture that as we add additional MAC/MAE provisions to our database, we will be 
able to enhance this performance significantly.   
 
5. Discussion, Extensions and Conclusion  
 
Although we consider the above exercise to be a successful first step, it is limited 
by a number of factors – not the least of which is sample size.  With only 123 coded deals 
                                                 
11 Based on preliminary investigations, very little additional accuracy emerged from increasing the 
number of iterations to either 10,000 or 100,000. 
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to work with, we were unable to marshal much of the potential power of both RE and 
LSA protocols (particularly the latter) in calibrating our predictive models.  We are 
currently working to expand the size of our experimental data over time and cross-
sectionally. 
Similarly, we have limited our attention here to deals that are both publicly 
available and coded in the Nixon-Peabody dataset.  An obvious follow-on step would be 
to take our predictive model outside this data set, applying it to all publicly available 
merger agreements (be they included in the experimental data or not).  We are currently 
in the process of implementing this step for the years 2007-10, and will report on results 
in a later draft of this paper. 
A third extension of our approach would be to utilize alternative existing data to 
provide an quasi-experimental calibration device for tokenizing a larger database.  
Although the Nixon-Peabody data is rich, detailed, and coded by practicing lawyers, it is 
not unique.  In particular the American Bar Association also harvests a regular survey of 
M&A agreements (including MAC/MAE clauses) that could provide either a useful 
calibration check, or additional coding attributes not available in the Nixon-Peabody data. 
Yet another factor that constrained our analysis concerned the inherent limitations 
in using an experimental data set (Nixon-Peabody, ABA or something else) that is not 
collected under conventional experimental conditions.  As noted above, we were unable 
to exercise control over either the conditions under which lawyers coded this data, or the 
targets of their efforts.  Thus, we were unable to track subject-specific effects or other 
systemic factors that may have affected the reliability of the coding efforts.  Moreover, 
we could not glean other – potentially more interesting – metrics for the breadth and 
content of a MAC/MAE provision.  For instance, the Nixon-Peabody data does not elicit 
an all-things-considered assessment of whether a particular provision is buyer- or seller-
friendly, or how complex and unpredictable its application might be in practice.  Nor, for 
that matter, does the data elicit information about monetary tradeoffs that a representative 
buyer / seller might make in  negotiating over a MAC/MAE provision (e.g., how much of 
a discount would a seller demand or a buyer accept in order to move from a relatively 
stingy MAC/MAE to one that gave the buyer additional outs?).  We are currently piloting 
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a more controlled experimental instrument that attempts to elicit this information, and 
which will constitute a separate paper from this one. 
Notwithstanding its significant recent growth, data-driven empirical methods in 
legal scholarship have only begun to scratch the surface of their ultimate capabilities.  
Litigated cases, appellate opinions, and Supreme Court decisions – the chief targets of 
much of the current ELS literature – are but a tiny fraction of what attorneys actually do 
in practice.  Much transactional work, particularly within business law, is only now 
beginning to lend itself to serious quantitative analysis.  This project presents some initial 
steps in pushing those efforts forward in the M&A context, and in a way that facilitates 
the harvesting of data at a lower cost, with greater consistency, and more dynamic 
adaptability than is currently the available.   Based on our results thus far, we are 
optimistic that we can implement our protocol on a wide scale basis, not only to 
understand the nature and evolution of MAC / MAE clauses (an important topic itself), 
but also to facilitate the harvesting of data across a large array of legal transactional 
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Appendix 1: Screen shot from pilot study; Python-based interface. 
 
This screen shot displays a typical user interface as the program scours a sample 
acquisition agreement.  In this screen shot, the program detects three species of 











MBOF Affirmative MAC on the business, operations, financial condition, etc. 94.3%
MSelAbil Affirmative MAC on Seller’s ability to close the deal 48.8%
MExessLos Affirmative MAC for losses over a specified threshold  2.4%
MPrspects Affirmative MAC on prospects of the Company/Target 2.4%
MAssets Affirmative MAC on the securities or other assets of target 21.1%
MReasExp Affirmative MAC triggered if there is reasonable expectation of event 
to have a material adverse effect/change prospectively 
12.2%
MDispEffct Definition of materiality tied to "Disproportionate Effects"  73.2%
EChEcon Exception for change in economy or business in general 82.1%
EChGen Exception for change in general conditions of the specific industry 79.7%
EChSecM Exception for change in securities markets 63.4%
EChPrVol Exception for change in trading price or trading volume of Company’s 
stock 
52.0%
EChIntR Exception for change in interests rates 18.7%
EChExch Exception for change in foreign exchange rates 14.6%
EWar Exception for acts of war or major hostilities 76.4%
ETerror Exception for acts of terrorism 79.7%
EGod Exception for acts of God 30.1%
ERedCust Exception for reduction of customers or decline in business 29.3%
EAnnTran Exception for effects of the announcement of the transaction 71.5%
EChAction Exception for changes caused by the taking of any action required or 
permitted or in any way resulting from or arising in connection with 
the agreement 
70.7%
EChGAAP Exception for changes in GAAP 85.4%
   










MBOF MSelAbil MExessLos MPrspects MAssets MReasExp MDispEffct EChEcon EChGen EChSecM EChPrVol EChIntR EChExch EWar ETerror EGod ERedCust EAnnTran EChActionEChGAAP
MBOF 1
MSelAbil 0.099317 1
MExessLos 0.038841 0.162019 1
MPrspects 0.038841 0.056578 -0.025 1
MAssets 0.127181 0.132142 0.047227 -0.08186 1
MReasExp -0.12294 0.08365 0.102138 -0.058926 0.050463 1
MDispEffct 0.326476 -0.10655 0.095743 -0.02321 0.043846 -0.11078 1
EChEcon 0.434773 0.200819 0.073794 0.0737939 0.085753 0.044274 0.291952 1
EChGen 0.39916 0.209977 0.07986 0.0798596 0.063563 -0.05873 0.286932 0.449594 1
EChSecM 0.104844 0.032121 -0.098746 -0.098746 0.103856 0.076743 0.18769 0.394241 0.245525 1
EChPrVol 0.185605 0.02541 0.046316 -0.059181 0.018795 0.009704 0.300104 0.188842 0.202526 0.047795 1
EChIntR 0.11781 -0.00916 -0.075829 -0.075829 -0.14615 0.076155 0.008035 0.11501 0.034965 0.19111 0.001357 1
EChExch 0.10171 -0.08193 -0.065465 -0.065465 -0.15802 0.056578 0.094967 0.133217 0.037642 0.17122 0.07524 0.686349 1
EWar 0.359594 -0.07103 -0.160503 -0.03634 -0.04081 -0.02712 0.225628 0.24054 0.243004 0.174573 0.233455 0.119012 0.175784 1
ETerror 0.224749 -0.03253 -0.18208 -0.05111 0.01408 0.003012 0.195737 0.238726 0.146531 0.245525 0.121647 0.138595 0.151962 0.766547 1
EGod 0.161128 -0.28546 -0.10371 0.0112119 -0.03565 -0.1361 0.197126 0.121097 0.066974 0.019749 0.239448 0.140096 0.179828 0.364323 0.287238 1
ERedCust 0.003762 -0.09155 -0.10171 0.0141263 -0.02669 0.033296 0.107216 0.067095 0.191691 0.228917 0.116896 0.103951 0.188656 0.062629 0.191691 0.006652 1
EAnnTran 0.311741 0.038686 -0.017094 -0.017094 -0.11482 0.014773 0.228137 0.457941 0.397889 0.269162 0.115826 0.071386 0.159157 0.243995 0.174008 0.099342 0.049261 1
EChAction 0.150495 0.127297 -0.014126 -0.129962 0.114215 -0.0879 0.296073 0.259282 0.252338 0.216249 0.276537 -0.05812 0.013564 0.063656 0.163533 0.03231 0.295977 0.227954 1
EChGAAP 0.295442 0.173971 0.065465 -0.08365 -0.06733 0.08401 0.16461 0.34695 0.362477 0.306332 0.247057 0.139572 0.106349 0.257728 0.362477 0.171265 0.114673 0.350642 0.340321 1




RE / Boolean 
Specification 
LSA 










MBOF 0.9431 0.5505 0.9512 0.81 0.9512 0.8011 
0.1034 0.05 0.0654 
MSelAbil 0.7886 0.7865 0.6260 0.6646 0.7886 0.8608 
0.0366 0.0492 0.0336 
MExessLos 0.9754 0.56 0.9837 0.8515 0.9837 0.8515 
0.132 0.1029 0.1029 
Mprospects 0.9756 0.6625 0.9756 0.8472 0.9837 0.8444 
0.1667 0.1132 0.1288 
Massets 0.7886 0.6887 0.7886 0.5946 0.7967 0.7179 
0.0489 0.0618 0.0552 
MReasExp 0.8760 0.51 0.8943 0.6596 0.9008 0.6664 
0.1911 0.0815 0.0805 
MDispEffct 0.7317 0.5965 0.7561 0.7215 0.7886 0.7182 
0.0506 0.0593 0.0603 
EChEcon 0.8211 0.5511 0.8537 0.7052 0.8537 0.7066 
0.0584 0.0614 0.0613 
EChGen 0.7967 0.572 0.8049 0.6865 0.8211 0.6918 
0.0557 0.0619 0.0607 
EChSecM 0.7317 0.7462 0.6260 0.5942 0.7642 0.8132 
0.04 0.0526 0.0407 
EChPrvol 0.7398 0.7427 0.6829 0.7299 0.7724 0.8292 
0.0391 0.0454 0.0381 
EChIntr 0.8618 0.6974 0.8211 0.7633 0.8618 0.8376 
0.0538 0.0499 0.0455 
EChExch 0.9024 0.7817 0.8699 0.8153 0.9106 0.882 
0.06 0.0556 0.0562 
EWar 0.7642 0.6812 0.7724 0.7196 0.7642 0.7929 
0.049 0.0464 0.0432 
Eterror 0.7967 0.7461 0.8130 0.7276 0.8049 0.8137 
0.0414 0.0513 0.0435 
EGod 0.7724 0.714 0.7317 0.7329 0.7724 0.7986 
0.0454 0.0494 0.0462 
ERedCust 0.8862 0.8788 0.7236 0.7701 0.8943 0.9132 
0.0355 0.0474 0.0319 
EAnnTran 0.7154 0.6153 0.7236 0.6722 0.7317 0.6946 
0.0495 0.0557 0.0552 
EChAction 0.7073 0.6652 0.7073 0.69 0.7073 0.7663 
    0.0478   0.0584   0.0475 
Table 3: Classification Rates and ROC-AUC for all data.  Baseline Regression is as in Equaton (2), which is 
estimated for each provision against three specifications: (a) RE Predictors only; (b) LSA Factors only; and 
(c) Hybrid RE and LSA.  The classification protocol in the first column of each panel assigns term as present 
if the computed marginal probability evaluated at the estimated coefficients exceeds 0.5.  The second column 





  LSA Specification 
Hybrid 
Model   
MAC/MAE Provision Corr. Class ROC-AUC Corr. Class ROC-AUC 
MBOF 0.913 0.61587 0.9284 0.5327 
  0.04744501 0.2975 0.04117 0.27813 
MSelAbil 0.54222 0.5599 0.7421667 0.783655 
  0.08408 0.0882 0.070876 0.0784866 
Massets 0.764333 0.6345 0.764 0.58404 
  0.0675466 0.1017 0.068276 0.10996 
MReasExp 0.864033 0.46393 0.8777333 0.49465 
  0.058078 0.16247 0.0555032 0.190937 
MDispEffct 0.7316 0.6609 0.7357333 0.6320073 
  0.067958 0.10718 0.07652223 0.1193881 
EChEcon 0.8209 0.5367427 0.8201667 0.6198363 
  0.05871753 0.1302458 0.06222236 0.131313 
EChGen 0.7823333 0.5047211 0.7692 0.583982 
  0.06921313 0.1315335 0.06542236 0.1247254 
EChSecM 0.5816 0.4832542 0.7038667 0.7294512 
  0.07611767 0.09772 0.07128283 0.0914256 
EChPrvol 0.5678333 0.6334498 0.7281 0.7751 
  0.07982975 0.087661 0.07246226 0.0852973 
EChIntr 0.7874667 0.6621522 0.8251 0.7240246 
  0.06722013 0.132249 0.06456472 0.1269156 
EChExch 0.8140667 0.5999294 0.8785 0.805348 
  0.0616201 0.1569705 0.05493118 0.1496069 
EWar 0.7290333 0.5679435 0.7242 0.7217855 
  0.06955984 0.100249 0.07423599 0.0949628 
Eterror 0.7728333 0.5361141 0.7530333 0.7372462 
  0.06653955 0.1150063 0.07099496 0.1141708 
EGod 0.6942333 0.5840398 0.7248333 0.727878 
  0.07621825 0.1060234 0.07321809 0.097808 
ERedCust 0.7230333 0.7399407 0.8596333 0.8586069 
  0.08007837 0.0928146 0.05638499 0.0849821 
EAnnTran 0.6908667 0.3879988 0.6821667 0.6091421 
  0.07399589 0.1039311 0.07364824 0.110092 
EChAction 0.7089 0.6196205 0.6671 0.6711904 
  0.0730488 0.105946 0.07533583 0.1100768 
Table 4: Monte-Carlo Simulation for out-of-sample prediction.  Baseline regression is 
as in Equaton (2), estimated 1000 times on a "training" dataset containing a 75% 
sample (sampled randomly, for each iteration), and generating (simulated) out-of-
sample predictions for the remaining 25%. For each term, the simulation explores two 
specifications: (a) LSA Factors only; and (b)Hybrid RE and LSA.  The classification 
protocol in the first column of each panel assigns term as present if the computed 
marginal probability evaluated at the estimated coefficients exceeds 0.5.  The second 
column of each specification reports estimates of the area under the ROC.  Empirical 
standard errors appear beneath, in italics. (The MAC terms MExessLos and 
MProspects could not be simulated reliably because of their low-frequency 
representation in the data). 
 
